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only to those involved with North Ko-
rea. Anyone involved in negotiations
will benefit from this book.
XAVIER K. MARUYAMA
Monterey, California
Betts, Richard K., and Thomas G. Mahnken, eds.
Paradoxes of Strategic Intelligence: Essays in Honor
of Michael J. Handel. London: Frank Cass, 2003.
210pp. $114.95
The essays in this collection were writ-
ten for an international conference held
in honor of the late Michael J. Handel
at the U.S. Naval War College. Handel
wrote several seminal pieces in the rela-
tively new field of intelligence studies,
and his colleagues are to be compli-
mented for producing this impressive
Festschrift. Betts and Mahnken put to-
gether an impressive group of practitio-
ners and academics to write on various
aspects of the work of intelligence
agencies. It begins with four articles of
a theoretical nature, followed by three
articles that focus on historic case
studies.
This volume appropriately opens with a
classic by Handel on strategic surprises,
published almost thirty years ago,
which serves as an excellent introduc-
tion to a book devoted to intelligence.
It is typical of Handel’s general thinking
on strategic affairs, pointing out several
paradoxes inherent to the potential for
strategic surprise that have become the
common wisdom of the intelligence
field. Handel claims that due to the
great difficulties in differentiating be-
tween “noise” and “signals” (relevant
information), all data amounts to noise,
making the collection of additional
information designed to clarify the
situation additional noise. Handel also
stresses the paradox of estimating risk.
The riskier a military course of action,
the less a rival anticipates and prepares
for it, paradoxically making its eventual
adoption less risky. Handel also sug-
gests that successive intelligence suc-
cesses increase not only the agency’s
credibility but also the risk of strategic
surprise, because its conclusions will
be less subject to critical questioning.
There is also the self-negating proph-
ecy. A warning of an impending attack
triggers military preparations that in
turn prompt the enemy to delay or can-
cel his plans. Such a scenario makes it
almost impossible even in retrospect to
know if the military preparations were
warranted. Another scenario that may
lead to a strategic surprise is a quiet
international environment that may
be used to conceal the preparations
for an attack. Following a fascinating
analysis of the problems of percep-
tion, the politics of intelligence, and
the organizational and bureaucratic
features, Handel reaches the realistic
conclusion that surprise is almost al-
ways unavoidable.
The second article, by editor Richard K.
Betts, starts with the unconventional
premise that politicization of intelli-
gence services is not necessarily bad,
and sometimes it is even advisable.
Betts presents two opposing models of
intelligence work. The first portrays
the intelligence agency striving to
achieve professional credibility by pre-
senting thorough analysis, while the
second depicts the intelligence organi-
zation stressing the supply of data that
is useful and relevant to decision mak-
ers. In the second case, the managers
of intelligence organizations make
compromises and tailor the information
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to influence the decision-making pro-
cess. Betts points out that there is inev-
itable tension between maximizing
credibility and utility, but he makes a
convincing case for reducing this ten-
sion by accepting a certain level of un-
defined politicization. Betts’s
recommended recipe for minimizing
the damage of politicization in the in-
telligence community is organizational
pluralism.
Woodrow J. Kuhns, a senior CIA offi-
cial, next points out that despite the
fact that a significant number of intel-
ligence failures have been docu-
mented, there is no clear track record
for estimates or warning judgments is-
sued by the intelligence community.
Moreover, there is no accumulated
knowledge for distinguishing between
failures attributed to collection, or to
analysis. Nevertheless, Kuhns still
tends to regard intelligence forecasts as
closer to science than to pseudo-
science, despite the methodological
problems in producing forecasts, and
suggests additional systematic research
to clarify the issues he has raised.
James J. Wirtz then discusses the theory
of strategic surprise and admits to oper-
ational difficulties. Wirtz claims that
every curriculum of the officers corps
stresses strategic surprise as a force
multiplier, and as such, military doc-
trine is predispositioned to carry out
surprises. Wirtz elaborates on the risk
paradox first mentioned by Handel,
pointing out the attraction of surprise
for the weaker parties of the conflict. At
this point, Wirtz argues that surprises
may produce only temporary spectacu-
lar results, leaving the general balance
of forces to finally determine the result
of armed conflict. Nevertheless, Wirtz
concludes that strong countries such as
the United States must do their best to
prevent unpleasant surprises—such as
9/11, for example.
John Ferris reviews the evolution of
British military deception during the
two world wars. He provides a detailed
narrative on the deception efforts that
were highly regarded by the British gen-
erals. Ferris argues that deception
benefits the stronger player in the con-
flict and the one holding the initiative,
but he displays skepticism of its final
utility. This article could have benefited
from heavy editing, as it is deficient in
organization and in the use of theoreti-
cal concepts.
Uri Bar-Joseph’s article addresses the
question of why some Israeli intelli-
gence officers—even at the highest
rank—erred in their estimates of the
probability of an imminent war in
1973. He argues convincingly that the
two officers most responsible for the in-
telligence failure were Y. Bandman and
E. Zeira, making the more general point
that organizations cannot transcend the
weaknesses of their personnel. How-
ever, Bar-Joseph could have made this
important point concerning the human
factor by explaining the lack of a strate-
gic warning before the 1973 war with-
out belittling other reasons for the main
misfortunes of the Israeli military in its
encounter with the Egyptian and Syrian
armies.
The final chapter, by Mark M. Lowenthal,
who is also with the CIA, looks at the
U.S. war-fighting doctrine that originally
emphasized information dominance
(Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1997), and subse-
quently more modestly aspired to supe-
riority only (2000). Lowenthal warns
against the belief that technological ad-
vances can remove the fog of war. Even
the best technologies need appropriate
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doctrine to be useful. He argues cogently
that advanced intelligence systems have
their own vulnerabilities, and that lacu-
nae of information are inevitable both
before and during war. Moreover, by
using examples from the American Civil
War, Lowenthal demonstrates that
good information about the enemy’s
moves and intentions is not enough for
winning the battle. It is generalship, the
human factor, that will continue to be
decisive in the outcome of a war.
This is an excellent introductory collec-
tion for students and the professional
reader to the gamut of issues with
which the field of intelligence grapples.
EFRAIM INBAR
Director, Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies
Bar-Ilan University, Israel
Clancy, Tom, with General Tony Zinni (Ret.) and
Tony Koltz. Battle Ready. New York: Putnam,
2004. 440pp. $28.95
This excellent book documents the mil-
itary and postmilitary career of General
Tony Zinni, USMC (Ret.). It should ap-
peal to any reader interested in the U.S.
military, the U.S. Marine Corps, and
national security affairs.
The book follows an engaging and
mixed style. Clancy and Koltz use short
biographical sections to introduce
phases of General Zinni’s career. At the
end of each phase, Zinni’s own words
(in italics) pick up the action. One has
the sense of being right there with the
general, sharing his experiences and
watching him develop into an excep-
tional military role model and leader.
The book actually begins with the end
of Zinni’s career. It is November 1998,
and he is halfway through his last
assignment as the sixth commander in
chief of Central Command. We are in-
troduced to the refined thinking of a
fighting soldier and leader, thinking
based on his extensive tactical, opera-
tional, and strategic experience in war,
conflict resolution, and peacemaking.
At that time, Zinni’s immediate focus
was Saddam Hussein and supporting
the UNSCOM (United Nations Special
Commission) inspectors under Richard
Butler. By mid-December, UN teams
began departing Iraq. What follows is
the four-day, preplanned attack of
Operation DESERT FOX. Although the
planning for the attack provides insight
into General Zinni’s war-fighting skills,
such as the importance and execution of
surprise, it is the introduction to his
breadth of strategic thinking that is most
interesting.
At the start of his command in August
1997, Zinni proposed a six-point strate-
gic program for Central Command to
President Clinton’s secretary of defense,
William Cohen. His objective was to
take a more balanced approach to a
wide range of evolving security issues,
not just Iraq and Saddam Hussein. Af-
ter presenting the program to Cohen
and senior members of Congress, Zinni
was politely told to “stay out of policy
and stick to execution.” That raises an
important point for military officers
preparing themselves for high com-
mand. Civilian control of the military
and selfless military service to the coun-
try are fundamental to our government,
going back to George Washington and
George Marshall. Based on the rest of
the book, it is apparent that Zinni con-
sistently struck that delicate profes-
sional balance between the truthful,
informed, and forceful advice and re-
spect for civilian authority.
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